Chan Sarah, Harris John
Ethics and Innovation, School of Law, University of Manchester.
Bioethics. 2009 Mar;23(3):161-71. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00648.x. Epub 2007 Apr 23.
John Harris has previously proposed that there is a moral duty to participate in scientific research. This concept has recently been challenged by Iain Brassington, who asserts that the principles cited by Harris in support of the duty to research fail to establish its existence. In this paper we address these criticisms and provide new arguments for the existence of a moral obligation to research participation. This obligation, we argue, arises from two separate but related principles. The principle of fairness obliges us to support the social institutions which sustain us, of which research is one; while the principle of beneficence, or the duty of rescue, imposes upon us a duty to prevent harm to others, including by supporting potentially beneficial, even life-saving research. We argue that both these lines of argument support the duty to research, and explore further aspects of this duty, such as to whom it is owed and how it might be discharged.
约翰·哈里斯此前曾提出，参与科学研究存在道德义务。这一概念最近受到了伊恩·布拉辛顿的挑战，他声称哈里斯为支持研究义务所引用的原则未能确立该义务的存在。在本文中，我们回应这些批评，并为存在参与研究的道德义务提供新的论据。我们认为，这一义务源自两个独立但相关的原则。公平原则要求我们支持维系我们的社会制度，研究就是其中之一；而 beneficence（行善）原则，即救助义务，使我们有责任防止他人受到伤害，包括通过支持潜在有益甚至救命的研究。我们认为这两条论证思路都支持研究义务，并探讨了该义务的其他方面，比如该义务的对象是谁以及如何履行该义务。
