Leidl Reiner
Ludwig-Maximilians-University and Helmholtz Zentrum München, Munich, Germany.
Int J Health Care Finance Econ. 2008 Sep;8(3):193-208. doi: 10.1007/s10754-008-9037-z. Epub 2008 Jun 22.
For an individual insurance firm offering supplementary private health insurance, a model is developed to decompose market performance in terms of insurer profits. For the individual contract, the model specifies the conditions under which adverse selection, cream skimming, and moral hazard occur, shows the impact of information on contracting, and the profit contribution. Contracts are determined by comparing willingness to pay for insurance with the individual's risk position, and information on both sides of the market. Finally, performance is aggregated up to the total market. The model provides a framework to explain the attractiveness of supplementary markets to insurers.
对于提供补充性私人医疗保险的个体保险公司，开发了一个模型，用于根据保险公司利润来分解市场表现。对于个人合同，该模型规定了逆向选择、撇脂和道德风险发生的条件，展示了信息对签约的影响以及利润贡献。合同通过比较保险支付意愿与个人风险状况以及市场双方的信息来确定。最后，将表现汇总到整个市场。该模型提供了一个框架来解释补充市场对保险公司的吸引力。
