McLachlan H V
School of Law and Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, Cowcaddens Road, Glasgow G4 0BA, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2008 Aug;34(8):636-8. doi: 10.1136/jme.2007.023382.
In their account of passive euthanasia, Garrard and Wilkinson present arguments that might lead one to overlook significant moral differences between killing and letting die. To kill is not the same as to let die. Similarly, there are significant differences between active and passive euthanasia. Our moral duties differ with regard to them. We are, in general, obliged to refrain from killing each and everyone. We do not have a similar obligation to try (or to continue to try) to prevent each and everyone from dying. In any case, to be morally obliged to persist in trying to prevent their deaths would be different from being morally obliged to refrain from killing all other people even if we had both obligations.
在对被动安乐死的论述中，加勒德和威尔金森提出的观点可能会让人忽视杀戮与听任死亡之间重大的道德差异。杀戮与听任死亡并不相同。同样，主动安乐死和被动安乐死之间也存在重大差异。我们在这方面的道德义务也有所不同。一般来说，我们有义务不杀害每一个人。我们并没有类似的义务去试图（或继续试图）阻止每一个人死亡。无论如何，在道德上有义务坚持试图阻止他们死亡，与即使我们有这两种义务，在道德上有义务不杀害所有其他人也是不同的。
