Roy M, Roy M-A, Grondin S
Ecole de psychologie, université Laval, Québec G1K 7P4, Canada.
Encephale. 2008 Sep;34(4):369-75. doi: 10.1016/j.encep.2007.08.007. Epub 2008 Jan 11.
While many neurocognitive models of schizophrenia coexist, a lot of attention has been centered on C.D. Frith's model over the past few years, especially in regard to its parsimony.
The aim of this paper is to examine its validity. The model relies on the assumption that there are two main components: self-monitoring and monitoring. The first permits one to keep consciousness of personal goals and intentions with metarepresentations. Losing consciousness of personal goals would be the source of schizophrenics' avolition and losing consciousness of personal intentions would generate reference ideas. The second component refers to the so-called "theory of mind", which is the monitoring of others' mental content (knowledge and intentions). Disturbing monitoring would cause schizophrenics persecution disillusions, third order persecutions or speech content disorders.
After reviewing the empirical and theoretical bases of Frith's model, strengths and weaknesses are highlighted, in particular by contrasting Hardy-Baylé's and Abu-Akel's theoretical proposals. For explaining the monitoring impairments of schizophrenics, Hardy-Baylé's model emphasizes the executive functioning defect, while Abu-Akel's model proposes a "hyper theory of mind" where too many hypotheses would lead to misattributions. In addition, several criticisms of Frith's model are examined, particularly those voiced by phenomenologists who underline its reductionism presupposition and argue that the underlying cognitive conception of the "theory of mind" neglects the fundamental intersubjectivity issue. In addition, Gallagher points out that monitoring is a tautological concept and that intention is not like thinking inherent to behaviour.
Frith's model validity is finally discussed at large in the light of these criticisms and competing models, and it is concluded that the self-monitoring part of the model needs to be redefined and that the measurement of the "theory of mind" has to be standardized.
虽然存在许多关于精神分裂症的神经认知模型，但在过去几年里，很多注意力都集中在了C.D.弗里思的模型上，尤其是因其简洁性。
本文旨在检验其有效性。该模型基于这样一种假设，即存在两个主要成分：自我监测和监测。前者使人能够通过元表征保持对个人目标和意图的意识。失去对个人目标的意识将成为精神分裂症患者意志缺失的根源，而失去对个人意图的意识会产生参照观念。第二个成分指的是所谓的“心理理论”，即对他人心理内容（知识和意图）的监测。监测受到干扰会导致精神分裂症患者产生被害妄想、三阶被害妄想或言语内容障碍。
在回顾了弗里思模型的实证和理论基础后，突出了其优点和缺点，特别是通过对比哈迪 - 贝耶的理论提议和阿布 - 阿克尔的理论提议。为了解释精神分裂症患者的监测障碍，哈迪 - 贝耶的模型强调执行功能缺陷，而阿布 - 阿克尔的模型提出一种“超心理理论”，即过多的假设会导致错误归因。此外，还审视了对弗里思模型的一些批评，特别是现象学家提出的批评，他们强调其还原论预设，并认为“心理理论”的潜在认知概念忽视了基本的主体间性问题。此外，加拉格尔指出监测是一个同义反复的概念，并且意图不像行为固有的思维。
最后，鉴于这些批评和竞争模型，对弗里思模型的有效性进行了广泛讨论，并得出结论，该模型的自我监测部分需要重新定义，并且“心理理论”的测量必须标准化。
