Cermolacce Michel, Naudin Jean, Parnas Josef
Danish National Research Foundation, Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.
Conscious Cogn. 2007 Sep;16(3):703-14. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.013. Epub 2007 Jul 13.
The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the 'mineness' of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, considered as different and less fundamental than the feeling of mineness. Two clinical vignettes of patients with the diagnosis of schizophrenia will be presented: the first one, illustrating early illness stages, and the second case, of chronic schizophrenia, symptomatically marked by persistent hallucinations. Through their analysis, we will discuss the experiential dimensions of minimal self.
当前，心灵哲学、认知科学和发展心理学领域正在对最小、基本、前反思或核心自我的概念展开辩论。然而，目前尚不清楚人们认为这样的自我具有哪些体验特征。研究精神分裂症患者的体验可能有助于探索最小自我的以下几个方面：视角概念和第一人称视角、现象场的“属我性”、透明度问题、观点的具身化，以及能动性和所有权问题，这些问题被认为与属我感不同且不如属我感根本。本文将呈现两例精神分裂症患者的临床案例：第一个案例展示疾病早期阶段，第二个案例是慢性精神分裂症，其症状表现为持续性幻觉。通过对这些案例的分析，我们将探讨最小自我的体验维度。
