Blanke Olaf, Metzinger Thomas
Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
Trends Cogn Sci. 2009 Jan;13(1):7-13. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003. Epub 2008 Dec 6.
We highlight the latest research on body perception and self-consciousness, but argue that despite these achievements, central aspects have remained unexplored, namely, global aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Researchers investigated central representations of body parts and actions involving these, but neglected the global and unitary character of self-consciousness, the 'I' of experience and behaviour. We ask, what are the minimally sufficient conditions for the appearance of a phenomenal self, that is, the fundamental conscious experience of being someone? What are necessary conditions for self-consciousness in any type of system? We offer conceptual clarifications, discuss recent empirical evidence from neurology and cognitive science and argue that these findings offer a new entry point for the systematic study of global and more fundamental aspects of self-consciousness.
我们重点介绍了关于身体感知和自我意识的最新研究，但认为尽管取得了这些成果，核心方面仍未得到探索，即身体自我意识的整体方面。研究人员研究了身体部位的核心表征以及涉及这些部位的动作，但忽略了自我意识的整体性和统一性，即体验与行为中的“我”。我们提出疑问，现象自我出现的最低充分条件是什么，也就是作为一个人的基本有意识体验是什么？任何类型的系统中自我意识的必要条件是什么？我们进行了概念上的澄清，讨论了神经学和认知科学的最新实证证据，并认为这些发现为系统研究自我意识的整体及更基本方面提供了新的切入点。
