Perc Matjaz, Szolnoki Attila, Szabó György
Department of Physics, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroska cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia.
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2008 Dec;78(6 Pt 2):066101. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.78.066101. Epub 2008 Dec 1.
We study the evolution of cooperation within the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice where a fraction of players mu can spread their strategy more easily than the rest due to a predetermined larger teaching capability. In addition, players characterized by the larger teaching capability are allowed to temporarily link with distant opponents of the same kind with probability p , thus introducing shortcut connections among the distinguished players. We show that these additional temporary connections are able to sustain cooperation throughout the whole range of the temptation to defect. Remarkably, we observe that, as the temptation to defect increases the optimal mu decreases, and moreover only minute values of p warrant the best promotion of cooperation. Our study thus indicates that influential individuals must be few and sparsely connected in order for cooperation to thrive in a defection-prone environment.
我们研究了在正方形晶格上的空间囚徒困境博弈中合作的演化，其中由于预先设定的更大的教学能力，一部分比例为μ的玩家能够比其他玩家更容易地传播他们的策略。此外，具有更大教学能力的玩家被允许以概率p与同类的远方对手临时建立联系，从而在这些有特殊能力的玩家之间引入捷径连接。我们表明，这些额外的临时连接能够在整个背叛诱惑范围内维持合作。值得注意的是，我们观察到，随着背叛诱惑的增加，最优的μ值会减小，而且只有极小的p值才能保证对合作的最佳促进。因此，我们的研究表明，为了使合作在容易出现背叛的环境中蓬勃发展，有影响力的个体必须很少且连接稀疏。
