Niksokhan Mohammad Hossein, Kerachian Reza, Karamouz Mohammad
University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Water Sci Technol. 2009;60(3):793-804. doi: 10.2166/wst.2009.394.
In this paper, a new Cooperative Trading Discharge Permit (CTDP) methodology is designed for estimating equitable and efficient treatment cost allocation among dischargers in a river system considering their conflicting interests. The methodology consists of two main steps: (1) initial treatment cost allocation and (2) equitable treatment cost reallocation. In the first step, a Pareto front among objectives is developed using a powerful and recently developed multi-objective genetic algorithm known as Nondominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm-II (NSGA-II). The objectives of the optimization model are considered to be the average treatment level of dischargers and a fuzzy risk of violating the water quality standards. The fuzzy risk is evaluated using the Monte Carlo analysis. The best non-dominated solution on the Pareto front, which provides the initial cost allocation to dischargers, is selected using the Young Bargaining Theory (YBT). In the second step, some cooperative game theoretic approaches are utilized to investigate how the maximum saving cost of participating dischargers in a coalition can be fairly allocated to them. The final treatment cost allocation provides the optimal trading discharge permit policies. The practical utility of the proposed methodology for river water quality management is illustrated through a realistic case study of the Zarjub river in the northern part of Iran.
本文设计了一种新的合作交易排放许可证（CTDP）方法，用于在考虑河流系统中排放者利益冲突的情况下，估算公平且高效的处理成本分配。该方法包括两个主要步骤：（1）初始处理成本分配和（2）公平处理成本重新分配。在第一步中，使用一种强大且最近开发的多目标遗传算法——非支配排序遗传算法-II（NSGA-II），在目标之间生成帕累托前沿。优化模型的目标被认为是排放者的平均处理水平和违反水质标准的模糊风险。使用蒙特卡罗分析评估模糊风险。利用杨格议价理论（YBT）从帕累托前沿中选择为排放者提供初始成本分配的最佳非支配解。在第二步中，运用一些合作博弈论方法来研究如何将联盟中参与排放者的最大节约成本公平地分配给他们。最终的处理成本分配提供了最优的交易排放许可证政策。通过伊朗北部扎尔朱布河的实际案例研究，说明了所提方法在河流水质管理中的实际效用。
