School of Civil Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
Environ Monit Assess. 2012 Oct;184(10):5875-88. doi: 10.1007/s10661-011-2387-x. Epub 2011 Oct 20.
One of the important issues in river quality management is to provide pollution control strategies which are acceptable for all stakeholders. When there is only one water quality checkpoint in a reach of a river which receives pollution loads of several dischargers and dischargers are penalized for any water quality violation, the game theory can be used for modeling the natural process of bargaining among load dischargers considering the assimilative capacity of a river. There are also some types of uncertainties in river water quality management which should be incorporated throughout the bargaining process. Signaling games can be utilized for modeling the bargaining among dischargers and developing perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) strategies for pollution control. In this paper, a new methodology called N-person iterated signaling game is developed for river quality management considering the existing uncertainties in pollution loads of dischargers. The methodology can provide the stable PBE waste load allocation strategies. The practical utility of the proposed methodology is illustrated by applying it to a reach of the Zarjub River in Iran. This reach includes seven pollution load dischargers.
在河流质量管理中，一个重要的问题是提供为所有利益相关者所接受的污染控制策略。当河流的一段只有一个水质检测点，而该河段接收了多个排污者的污染负荷，并且排污者因任何水质违规而受到处罚时，可以使用博弈论来模拟考虑河流自净能力的排污者之间的自然讨价还价过程。在河流水质管理中，还有一些类型的不确定性，应该在整个讨价还价过程中加以考虑。信号博弈可以用于模拟排污者之间的讨价还价，并为污染控制制定完美贝叶斯均衡（PBE）策略。本文提出了一种新的方法，称为多人迭代信号博弈，用于考虑排污者污染负荷中存在的不确定性的河流质量管理。该方法可以提供稳定的 PBE 废水负荷分配策略。通过将其应用于伊朗扎尔朱卜河的一个河段来验证所提出方法的实际应用，该河段有七个污染负荷排污者。
