School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Wellington Road, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.
J Med Ethics. 2009 Dec;35(12):747-52. doi: 10.1136/jme.2009.030601.
Peter Singer has argued that we should not proceed with a hypothetical life-extension drug, based on a scenario in which developing the drug would fail to achieve the greatest sum of happiness over time. However, this is the wrong test. If we ask, more simply, which policy would be more benevolent, we reach a different conclusion from Singer's: even given his (admittedly questionable) scenario, development of the drug should go ahead. Singer's rigorous utilitarian position pushes him in the direction of an implausible "total view" utilitarianism when it encounters the problems presented by certain thought experiments. A more pluralistic account of the nature of morality promises to solve these problems, and in this case it reaches a benevolent recommendation on life-extension technology.
彼得·辛格（Peter Singer）认为，我们不应该进行一种假设的延寿药物的研发，因为这种药物的研发无法随着时间的推移实现最大的幸福总和。然而，这是错误的测试。如果我们更简单地问，哪种政策会更仁慈，我们会从辛格那里得出不同的结论：即使考虑到他（诚然有疑问的）的设想，也应该推进这种药物的研发。辛格严格的功利主义立场在遇到某些思想实验所提出的问题时，将他推向了一种看似不合理的“总体观点”功利主义。一种更具多元性的道德本质观有望解决这些问题，在这种情况下，它对延寿技术提出了仁慈的建议。
