Emmy-Noether Group for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, 24306 Plön, Germany.
J Theor Biol. 2010 Mar 21;263(2):262-8. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.11.025. Epub 2009 Dec 6.
Evolutionary game dynamics describes frequency dependent selection in asexual, haploid populations. It typically considers predefined strategies and fixed payoff matrices. Mutations occur between these known types only. Here, we consider a situation in which a mutation has produced an entirely new type which is characterized by a random payoff matrix that does not change during the fixation or extinction of the mutant. Based on the probability distribution underlying the payoff values, we address the fixation probability of the new mutant. It turns out that for weak selection, only the first moments of the distribution matter. For strong selection, the probability that a new payoff entry is larger than the wild type's payoff against itself is the crucial quantity.
进化博弈动力学描述了无性、单倍体群体中的频率依赖性选择。它通常考虑预定义的策略和固定的收益矩阵。突变仅在这些已知类型之间发生。在这里，我们考虑一种情况，其中突变产生了一种全新的类型，其特征是随机收益矩阵，在突变体的固定或灭绝过程中不会改变。基于收益值的概率分布，我们解决了新突变体的固定概率。事实证明，对于弱选择，只有分布的第一矩是重要的。对于强选择，新收益项大于自身对野生型收益的概率是关键数量。
