Ecologie et Evolution, Unité Mixte de Recherche 7625, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université Pierre et Marie Curie, Bâtiment A, 7ème étage, Case 237, 7 Quai Saint Bernard, F-75252 Paris Cedex 05, France.
Am Nat. 2010 Feb;175(2):197-210. doi: 10.1086/649597.
The vast majority of human beings regularly engage in reciprocal cooperation with nonrelated conspecifics, and yet the current evolutionary understanding of these behaviors is insufficient. Intuitively, reciprocity should evolve if past behavior conveys information about future behavior. But it is not straightforward to understand why this should be an outcome of evolution. Most evolutionary models assume that individuals' past behavior informs others about their stable social type (defector, cooperator, reciprocator, etc.), which makes it sensible to reciprocate. In this article, after describing the central source of difficulty in the evolutionary understanding of reciprocity, I put forward an alternative explanation based on a work by O. Leimar. It consists of taking into account the fact that the payoffs to individuals in social interactions can change through time. This offers a solution because individuals' past behavior then signals their payoffs, which also makes it sensible to reciprocate. Even though the overwhelming majority of evolutionary models implicitly endorse the social types mechanism, I argue that the social incentives mechanism may underlie reciprocity in humans.
绝大多数人类经常与非亲属的同类进行互惠合作，但目前对这些行为的进化理解还不够充分。直观地说，如果过去的行为传递了关于未来行为的信息，那么互惠应该会进化。但为什么这应该是进化的结果并不容易理解。大多数进化模型假设个体过去的行为可以向他人传达其稳定的社会类型（背叛者、合作者、互惠者等），这使得互惠是合理的。在本文中，在描述了互惠进化理解中的核心难点之后，我提出了一个基于 O. Leimar 的工作的替代解释。它包括考虑到社会互动中个体的收益会随时间变化的事实。这提供了一个解决方案，因为个体过去的行为会传递他们的收益，这也使得互惠是合理的。尽管绝大多数进化模型隐含地支持社会类型机制，但我认为社会激励机制可能是人类互惠的基础。
