Institut Jean Nicod, Département d'études cognitives, Ecole normale supérieure, Université PSL, EHESS, CNRS, 75005 Paris, France.
LTCI, Télécom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, 91120 Palaiseau, France.
Proc Biol Sci. 2022 Apr 27;289(1973):20212266. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2021.2266.
Many evolutionary models explain why we cooperate with non-kin, but few explain why cooperative behaviour and trust vary. Here, we introduce a model of cooperation as a signal of time preferences, which addresses this variability. At equilibrium in our model (i) future-oriented individuals are more motivated to cooperate, (ii) future-oriented populations have access to a wider range of cooperative opportunities, and (iii) spontaneous and inconspicuous cooperation reveal stronger preference for the future, and therefore inspire more trust. Our theory sheds light on the variability of cooperative behaviour and trust. Since affluence tends to align with time preferences, results (i) and (ii) explain why cooperation is often associated with affluence, in surveys and field studies. Time preferences also explain why we trust others based on proxies for impulsivity, and, following result (iii), why uncalculating, subtle and one-shot cooperators are deemed particularly trustworthy. Time preferences provide a powerful and parsimonious explanatory lens, through which we can better understand the variability of trust and cooperation.
许多进化模型解释了为什么我们会与非亲属合作，但很少有模型解释合作行为和信任的变化。在这里，我们引入了一种合作模型，将其作为时间偏好的信号，以解决这种可变性。在我们的模型中达到平衡时：（i）面向未来的个体更有合作的动力；（ii）面向未来的群体拥有更广泛的合作机会；（iii）自发且不引人注目的合作表现出对未来更强的偏好，从而激发更多的信任。我们的理论揭示了合作行为和信任的可变性。由于富裕往往与时间偏好一致，结果（i）和（ii）解释了为什么合作在调查和实地研究中经常与富裕联系在一起。时间偏好也解释了为什么我们会根据冲动的代表来信任他人，并且，根据结果（iii），为什么不计后果、微妙且一次性的合作者被认为特别值得信赖。时间偏好提供了一个强大而简洁的解释性视角，通过它我们可以更好地理解信任和合作的可变性。
