Pérez-Stable E J
Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco 94143-0320.
Am J Public Health. 1991 May;81(5):563-7. doi: 10.2105/ajph.81.5.563.
Cuba's response to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic has been to conduct mass testing of the population to ascertain seroprevalence, to enforce mandatory relative quarantine of persons testing positive, and to implement educational interventions using media and school-based programs.
Interview with the Vice-Minister of Health and review of available data.
Reports to date show a very low seroprevalence rate without evidence of a widespread epidemic. Sexual contact with foreign-born persons is the primary risk factor. Possible advantages of Cuba's policy include rapid reduction in the risk of HIV transmission by infected blood products, an opportunity for focused education and secondary prevention, and limitation of new infections. Possible disadvantages include the restriction of individual freedom in those who are not guilty of any illegal act, quarantine of persons with false positive HIV tests, and ongoing transmission because of the incomplete nature of the quarantine. The policy is expensive and may displace other public health priorities. The content of the media-based educational interventions has emphasized rational medical information in unimaginative formats with a limited focus on prevention.
The issue of personal responsibility for behavioral change versus government imposed regulations is at the core of Cuba's HIV policy. The quarantine policy may paradoxically permit most Cubans to feel that they are personally invulnerable to the HIV epidemic.
古巴应对人类免疫缺陷病毒(HIV)疫情的措施包括对民众进行大规模检测以确定血清流行率,对检测呈阳性者实施强制性相对隔离,并通过媒体和学校项目开展教育干预。
对卫生部副部长进行访谈并审查现有数据。
迄今为止的报告显示血清流行率极低,没有广泛流行的迹象。与外国出生者发生性接触是主要风险因素。古巴政策的可能优势包括迅速降低受感染血液制品传播HIV的风险,提供集中教育和二级预防的机会,以及限制新感染病例。可能的劣势包括限制了未实施任何违法行为者的个人自由,对HIV检测呈假阳性者进行隔离,以及由于隔离的不完整性导致病毒持续传播。该政策成本高昂,可能会取代其他公共卫生重点工作。基于媒体的教育干预内容强调以缺乏想象力的形式提供理性医学信息,对预防的关注有限。
行为改变的个人责任与政府强制规定的问题是古巴HIV政策的核心。隔离政策可能会自相矛盾地使大多数古巴人觉得他们个人不会感染HIV。