Rodrigues Adriano C T, Banzato Claudio E M
Health Sciences Centre, Federal University of Piauí - UFPI, Teresina, Piauí, Brazil.
Philos Ethics Humanit Med. 2010 Feb 25;5:5. doi: 10.1186/1747-5341-5-5.
Delusion is one of the most intriguing psychopathological phenomena and its conceptualization remains the subject of genuine debate. Claims that it is ill-defined, however, are typically grounded on essentialist expectations that a given definition should capture the core of every instance acknowledged as delusion in the clinical setting.
In this paper, we attempt to show the major limitations of the definition of delusion from a non-essentialist point of view.
The problem is analyzed within the framework of constructs and their translation into definitions. Different linguistic and epistemological perspectives that do concur when one deals with psychopathological phenomena are also considered.
The 'construct of delusion', rather than its clinical instances, is the reference in which its definition appears inept. Here we claim that the broad contextual and pragmatic bases that underpin the construct of delusion tend to be either overlooked or downplayed in the quest for a satisfactory definition of this phenomenon.
妄想是最引人入胜的精神病理现象之一，其概念化仍是一个真正有争议的话题。然而，认为妄想定义不明确的观点通常基于本质主义的期望，即给定的定义应抓住临床环境中被视为妄想的每个实例的核心。
在本文中，我们试图从非本质主义的角度展示妄想定义的主要局限性。
在构念及其转化为定义的框架内分析该问题。还考虑了在处理精神病理现象时确实一致的不同语言和认识论观点。
“妄想构念”而非其临床实例，是其定义显得不恰当的参照。我们在此声称，在寻求对这一现象的满意定义时，支撑妄想构念的广泛背景和实用基础往往被忽视或淡化。
