Department of Medical Humanities, Brody School of Medicine, East Carolina University, Greenville, NC 27701, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2010 Apr;36(4):217-21. doi: 10.1136/jme.2009.034645.
This paper focuses on one objection to the use of reproductive genetic technologies (RGTs): the argument known as the expressivist objection. According to this argument, the choice to use reproductive genetic technologies to prevent the birth of individuals with disabilities is an expression of disvalue for existing people with disability. Many have been persuaded by this impassioned perspective. This paper shows that this argument is misguided and so does not constitute a sound objection to the use of RGTs to prevent disability in future children. It first identifies some responses to the objection that may be sound but not completely convincing to proponents of the expressivist position. It then describes a thought experiment designed to demonstrate more clearly that choosing to use RGTs to prevent disability in future children does not convey a negative message about people who have disabilities. After describing a decision that clearly does not send such a message, the paper walks through a series of cases and shows how, despite differences that might seem to be morally relevant, each is morally equivalent to the previous one with respect to the extent that it expresses disvalue for such individuals.
本文聚焦于对生殖遗传技术（RGTs）使用的一种反对意见：即所谓的表现主义反对意见。根据这一论点，选择使用生殖遗传技术来防止残疾个体的出生，是对现有残疾人士的一种贬损表达。许多人被这种慷慨激昂的观点所说服。本文表明，这种观点是有误导性的，因此并不能构成对使用 RGTs 来防止未来儿童残疾的合理反对。本文首先确定了一些对该反对意见的回应，这些回应可能是合理的，但对于表现主义立场的支持者来说，并不是完全有说服力的。然后，本文描述了一个思想实验，旨在更清楚地表明，选择使用 RGTs 来防止未来儿童残疾，并不会传达对残疾人士的负面信息。在描述了一个显然不会传达此类信息的决策之后，本文通过一系列案例进行了说明，并表明，尽管存在一些看似具有道德相关性的差异，但每个案例在表达对这些个体的贬损方面，与前一个案例在道德上是等同的。
