• 文献检索
  • 文档翻译
  • 深度研究
  • 学术资讯
  • Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件
  • 邀请有礼
  • 套餐&价格
  • 历史记录
应用&插件
Suppr Zotero 插件Zotero 插件浏览器插件Mac 客户端Windows 客户端微信小程序
定价
高级版会员购买积分包购买API积分包
服务
文献检索文档翻译深度研究API 文档MCP 服务
关于我们
关于 Suppr公司介绍联系我们用户协议隐私条款
关注我们

Suppr 超能文献

核心技术专利:CN118964589B侵权必究
粤ICP备2023148730 号-1Suppr @ 2026

文献检索

告别复杂PubMed语法,用中文像聊天一样搜索,搜遍4000万医学文献。AI智能推荐,让科研检索更轻松。

立即免费搜索

文件翻译

保留排版,准确专业,支持PDF/Word/PPT等文件格式,支持 12+语言互译。

免费翻译文档

深度研究

AI帮你快速写综述,25分钟生成高质量综述,智能提取关键信息,辅助科研写作。

立即免费体验

公共物品困境的一般模型。

A general model of the public goods dilemma.

机构信息

Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-2525, USA.

出版信息

J Evol Biol. 2010 Jun 1;23(6):1245-50. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2010.01986.x. Epub 2010 Mar 24.

DOI:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2010.01986.x
PMID:20345809
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2903212/
Abstract

An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favours individual contribution to public good [corrected] only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analysed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favours selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behaviour causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that contribute greatly to public benefit and social cohesion and to lower classes that contribute little to the public good. Second, if group success absolutely requires production of the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively high. By contrast, if group success depends weakly on the public good, then the pressure favouring production is relatively weak. Stated in this way, it is obvious that the role of baseline success is important. However, discussions of public goods problems sometimes fail to emphasize this point sufficiently. The models here suggest simple tests for the roles of resource variation and baseline success. Given the widespread importance of public goods, better models and tests would greatly deepen our understanding of many processes in biology and sociality.

摘要

对所有群体成员都有益但个体成本较高的行为就是公共物品。自然选择只在个体贡献对公共物品的收益足以抵消贡献成本时,才会有利于个体的公共物品贡献。性比问题、寄生虫毒力、微生物代谢、对非合作者的惩罚,以及几乎所有社会性的方面,都被分析为受亲缘选择和群体选择塑造的公共物品。在这里,我提出了公共物品问题的两个普遍方面,这两个方面相对较少受到关注。首先,个体资源的变化有利于自私的个体来改变他们对公共物品的分配。那些资源更充裕的个体将其多余的资源贡献出来,以获得公共利益,而资源较少的个体则较少地贡献于公共物品。因此,纯粹的自私行为导致个体分层为上层阶级,他们对公共利益和社会凝聚力有很大的贡献,而下层阶级对公共利益的贡献则很少。其次,如果群体的成功绝对需要公共物品的生产,那么有利于生产的压力就相对较高。相比之下,如果群体的成功在很大程度上取决于公共物品,那么有利于生产的压力就相对较弱。从这个角度来看,很明显,基线成功的作用是很重要的。然而,关于公共物品问题的讨论有时没有充分强调这一点。这里的模型提出了对资源变化和基线成功作用的简单测试。鉴于公共物品的广泛重要性,更好的模型和测试将极大地加深我们对生物学和社会性许多过程的理解。

相似文献

1
A general model of the public goods dilemma.公共物品困境的一般模型。
J Evol Biol. 2010 Jun 1;23(6):1245-50. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2010.01986.x. Epub 2010 Mar 24.
2
Cooperation, Trust, and Antagonism: How Public Goods Are Promoted.合作、信任与对抗:公共物品如何得到促进。
Psychol Sci Public Interest. 2013 Dec;14(3):119-65. doi: 10.1177/1529100612474436.
3
Cooperative investment in public goods is kin directed in communal nests of social birds.社会性鸟类的公共巢穴中存在亲代指向的公共物品合作投资。
Ecol Lett. 2014 Sep;17(9):1141-8. doi: 10.1111/ele.12320. Epub 2014 Jul 6.
4
Coexistence of cooperation and defection in public goods games.公共物品博弈中的合作与背叛共存。
Evolution. 2011 Apr;65(4):1140-8. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01185.x. Epub 2010 Dec 1.
5
Evolution of contribution timing in public goods games.公共物品博弈中贡献时机的演变。
Proc Biol Sci. 2020 May 27;287(1927):20200735. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2020.0735.
6
Evolution in group-structured populations can resolve the tragedy of the commons.群体结构化种群中的进化可以解决公地悲剧问题。
Proc Biol Sci. 2006 Jun 22;273(1593):1477-81. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2006.3476.
7
Cooperation as a volunteer's dilemma and the strategy of conflict in public goods games.合作作为一种志愿者困境和公共物品博弈中的冲突策略。
J Evol Biol. 2009 Nov;22(11):2192-200. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2009.01835.x. Epub 2009 Sep 3.
8
Dilemma of dilemmas: how collective and individual perspectives can clarify the size dilemma in voluntary linear public goods dilemmas.两难困境中的两难:集体视角与个体视角如何阐明自愿线性公共物品两难中的规模困境
PLoS One. 2015 Mar 23;10(3):e0120379. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0120379. eCollection 2015.
9
Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods.可扩散公共物品的空间困境
Elife. 2013 Dec 17;2:e01169. doi: 10.7554/eLife.01169.
10
Group-size diversity in public goods games.公共物品博弈中的群体规模多样性。
Evolution. 2012 Mar;66(3):623-636. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01504.x. Epub 2011 Dec 21.

引用本文的文献

1
Evolutionary modeling suggests that addictions may be driven by competition-induced microbiome dysbiosis.进化模型表明,成瘾可能是由竞争引起的微生物组失调所驱动的。
Commun Biol. 2023 Jul 26;6(1):782. doi: 10.1038/s42003-023-05099-0.
2
Evolutionary game theory and the adaptive dynamics approach: adaptation where individuals interact.进化博弈论与适应性动力学方法:个体相互作用时的适应性
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2023 May 8;378(1876):20210502. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2021.0502. Epub 2023 Mar 20.
3
How public can public goods be? Environmental context shapes the evolutionary ecology of partially private goods.公共物品可以有多公共?环境背景塑造了部分私人物品的进化生态学。
PLoS Comput Biol. 2022 Nov 1;18(11):e1010666. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010666. eCollection 2022 Nov.
4
The evolution of manipulative cheating.手法作弊的演变。
Elife. 2022 Oct 4;11:e80611. doi: 10.7554/eLife.80611.
5
The evolution of mechanisms to produce phenotypic heterogeneity in microorganisms.微生物中产生表型异质性的机制的演变。
Nat Commun. 2022 Jan 25;13(1):195. doi: 10.1038/s41467-021-27902-4.
6
Relatedness and the evolution of mechanisms to divide labor in microorganisms.微生物中的亲缘关系与分工机制的进化
Ecol Evol. 2021 Oct 8;11(21):14475-14489. doi: 10.1002/ece3.8067. eCollection 2021 Nov.
7
Two-dimensional adaptive dynamics of evolutionary public goods games: finite-size effects on fixation probability and branching time.进化公共品博弈的二维自适应动力学:有限规模对固定概率和分支时间的影响。
R Soc Open Sci. 2021 May 26;8(5):210182. doi: 10.1098/rsos.210182.
8
Social rank modulates how environmental quality influences cooperation and conflict within animal societies.社会等级调节着环境质量如何影响动物社会中的合作与冲突。
Proc Biol Sci. 2020 Sep 30;287(1935):20201720. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2020.1720.
9
Evolution of strategic cooperation.战略合作的演变
Evol Lett. 2020 Feb 25;4(2):164-175. doi: 10.1002/evl3.164. eCollection 2020 Apr.
10
Transmission, relatedness, and the evolution of cooperative symbionts.传播、亲缘关系与合作共生体的进化
J Evol Biol. 2019 Oct;32(10):1036-1045. doi: 10.1111/jeb.13505. Epub 2019 Jul 28.

本文引用的文献

1
FEMALE-BIASED SEX RATIOS: INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP SELECTION?偏向雌性的性别比例:个体选择还是群体选择?
Evolution. 1985 Mar;39(2):349-361. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.1985.tb05672.x.
2
HIERARCHICAL SELECTION THEORY AND SEX RATIOS. II. ON APPLYING THE THEORY, AND A TEST WITH FIG WASPS.层级选择理论与性别比例。II. 理论应用及对榕小蜂的一项测试
Evolution. 1985 Sep;39(5):949-964. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.1985.tb00440.x.
3
Phenotypic plasticity of a cooperative behaviour in bacteria.细菌中一种合作行为的表型可塑性。
J Evol Biol. 2009 Mar;22(3):589-98. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2008.01666.x. Epub 2008 Dec 18.
4
The tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology.进化生物学中的公地悲剧。
Trends Ecol Evol. 2007 Dec;22(12):643-51. doi: 10.1016/j.tree.2007.07.009. Epub 2007 Nov 5.
5
Sex ratio adaptations to local mate competition in a parasitic wasp.性比适应寄生蜂的本地配偶竞争。
Science. 1980 Jun 6;208(4448):1157-9. doi: 10.1126/science.208.4448.1157.
6
How does selection reconcile individual advantage with the good of the group?选择如何使个体利益与群体利益相协调?
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1977 Oct;74(10):4542-6. doi: 10.1073/pnas.74.10.4542.
7
Diminishing returns in social evolution: the not-so-tragic commons.社会进化中的收益递减:并非那么悲剧的公地悲剧
J Evol Biol. 2004 Sep;17(5):1058-72. doi: 10.1111/j.1420-9101.2004.00747.x.
8
The evolution of altruistic punishment.利他惩罚的演变
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 Mar 18;100(6):3531-5. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0630443100. Epub 2003 Mar 11.
9
Group beneficial norms can spread rapidly in a structured population.群体有益规范能够在结构化群体中迅速传播。
J Theor Biol. 2002 Apr 7;215(3):287-96. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2001.2515.
10
Sanctions and mutualism stability: why do rhizobia fix nitrogen?制裁与互利共生稳定性:根瘤菌为何固氮?
Proc Biol Sci. 2002 Apr 7;269(1492):685-94. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2001.1878.