Virginia Modeling, Analysis and Simulation Center, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA.
Risk Anal. 2010 Apr;30(4):575-89. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2010.01401.x.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), considerable efforts have been made to estimate the risks of terrorism and the cost effectiveness of security policies to reduce these risks. DHS, industry, and the academic risk analysis communities have all invested heavily in the development of tools and approaches that can assist decisionmakers in effectively allocating limited resources across the vast array of potential investments that could mitigate risks from terrorism and other threats to the homeland. Decisionmakers demand models, analyses, and decision support that are useful for this task and based on the state of the art. Since terrorism risk analysis is new, no single method is likely to meet this challenge. In this article we explore a number of existing and potential approaches for terrorism risk analysis, focusing particularly on recent discussions regarding the applicability of probabilistic and decision analytic approaches to bioterrorism risks and the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment methodology used by the DHS and criticized by the National Academies and others.
自 2001 年 9 月 11 日的恐怖袭击事件和随后成立的美国国土安全部 (DHS) 以来,已经做出了相当大的努力来估计恐怖主义风险和安全政策的成本效益,以降低这些风险。DHS、行业和学术风险分析界都在大力开发工具和方法,以帮助决策者有效地在可能减轻恐怖主义和其他对国土安全威胁的风险的广泛潜在投资中分配有限的资源。决策者需要针对这项任务并基于最先进技术的有用模型、分析和决策支持。由于恐怖主义风险分析是新的,因此不太可能有一种单一的方法能够满足这一挑战。在本文中,我们探讨了一些现有的和潜在的恐怖主义风险分析方法,特别关注最近关于概率和决策分析方法在生物恐怖主义风险中的适用性的讨论,以及 DHS 使用的生物恐怖主义风险评估方法,并受到了美国国家科学院等机构的批评。