Hoquet Thierry
Department of Philosophy, University of Nanterre, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre Cedex, France.
Isis. 2010 Mar;101(1):30-61. doi: 10.1086/652688.
While "natural history" is practically synonymous with the name of Buffon, the term itself has been otherwise overlooked by historians of science. This essay attempts to address this omission by investigating the meanings of "physique," "natural philosophy," and "history," among other terms, with the purpose of understanding Buffon's actual objectives. It also shows that Buffon never claimed to be a Newtonian and should not be considered as such; the goal is to provide a historical analysis that resituates Buffon's thought within his own era. This is done, primarily, by eschewing the often-studied question of time in Buffon. Instead, this study examines the nontemporal meanings of the word "history" within the naturalist's theory and method. The title of his Natural History is examined both as an indicator of the kind of science that Buffon was hoping to achieve and as a source of great misinterpretation among his peers. Unlike Buffon, many of his contemporaries actually envisioned the study of nature from a Baconian perspective where history was restricted to the mere collection of facts and where philosophy, which was the implicit and ultimate goal of studying nature, was seen, at least for the present, as unrealizable. Buffon confronts this tendency insofar as his Histoire naturelle claims to be the real physique that, along with describing nature, also sought to identify general laws and provide clear insight into what true knowledge of nature is or should be. According to Buffon, history (both natural and civil) is not analogous to mathematics; it is a nonmathematical method whose scope encompasses both nature and society. This methodological stance gives rise to the "physicization" of certain moral concepts--a gesture that was interpreted by his contemporaries as Epicurean and atheist. In addition, Buffon reduces a number of metaphysically tainted historical concepts (e.g., antediluvian monuments) to objects of physical analysis, thereby confronting the very foundation of natural theology. In Buffon, as this essay makes clear, natural history is paving the way for a new physique (science of natural beings), independent from mathematics and from God, that treats naturalia in a philosophical and "historical" manner that is not necessarily "temporal."
虽然“自然史”实际上与布丰的名字同义，但这个术语本身却被科学史家们忽视了。本文试图通过探究“自然哲学”“自然哲学”和“历史”等术语的含义来弥补这一疏漏，以理解布丰的实际目标。本文还表明，布丰从未声称自己是牛顿主义者，也不应被视为牛顿主义者；目标是提供一种历史分析，将布丰的思想重新置于他自己的时代背景中。这主要是通过回避经常被研究的布丰著作中的时间问题来实现的。相反，本研究考察了博物学家的理论和方法中“历史”一词的非时间性含义。他的《自然史》的书名既被视为布丰希望实现的那种科学的指标，也被视为他的同行们产生重大误解的根源。与布丰不同，他的许多同时代人实际上从培根主义的角度设想对自然的研究，在这种角度下，历史仅限于事实的简单收集，而哲学作为研究自然的隐含和最终目标，至少在目前被视为无法实现。布丰反对这种倾向，因为他的《自然史》声称是真正的自然哲学，它不仅描述自然，还试图识别普遍规律，并清晰洞察关于自然的真正知识是什么或应该是什么。按照布丰的说法，历史（自然史和文明史）与数学不同；它是一种非数学方法，其范围涵盖自然和社会。这种方法论立场导致了某些道德概念的“自然哲学化”——这一举动被他的同时代人解释为伊壁鸠鲁主义和无神论。此外，布丰将一些带有形而上学色彩的历史概念（如大洪水前的遗迹）简化为自然分析的对象，从而挑战了自然神学的基础。正如本文所明确指出的，在布丰那里，自然史正在为一门新的自然哲学（关于自然存在物的科学）铺平道路，这门科学独立于数学和上帝，以一种不一定是“时间性的”哲学和“历史”方式来处理自然事物。
