Demarest Boris, Wolfe Charles T
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium.
Hist Philos Life Sci. 2017 Mar;39(1):2. doi: 10.1007/s40656-016-0128-8. Epub 2016 Dec 30.
In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism (or in contrast the status of these notions as constructs, whether heuristic or otherwise scientifically useful). We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of "organised" and "organic" matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffon's case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them.
在本文中，我们思考了生物体概念与组织概念之间的联系，特别关注这一联系如何影响生物体实在性的问题（或者相反，这些概念作为构建物的地位，无论是启发性的还是在其他方面具有科学用途）。我们通过介绍布丰的例子来进行探讨，布丰对“有组织的”和“有机的”物质概念之间的关系提出了复杂的观点。我们认为，与一些解释者所暗示的相反，在他的思想中这些概念并非相互独立。此外，我们认为布丰有一种观点，即组织不仅无处不在，而且在本质上是基础且根本的，因此也是完全自然的。我们认为他之所以能持有这种观点，是因为他反对数学主义。在我们看来，布丰的例子很有趣，因为他可以将组织和生物体视为完全自然的，并且可以承认它们的实在性而无需援引有问题的超自然主义观点，还因为他允许组织和生物体存在种类和程度上的差异。因此，他的观点试图在关于生物体实在性的辩论中兼顾两个警示要点：需要秉持广义的自然主义视角，以及需要承认生物体那些让我们能够理解它们的有趣特征。
