Greenwood John
Universities of Edinburgh and Oxford.
J Hist Behav Sci. 2010 Summer;46(3):276-99. doi: 10.1002/jhbs.20441.
In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as "conscious automata" was not well chosen.
在本文中，我试图通过聚焦于托马斯·赫胥黎所倡导的副现象论版本，来对副现象论学说进行一些历史的阐释，该版本常被视为该学说的经典表述。我认为，赫胥黎是否持有任何形式的形而上学副现象论是值得怀疑的，并且他在意识方面持有一种更为有限的经验性副现象论，但在心智本身方面并非如此。与传统观点相反，赫胥黎关于意识的经验性副现象论并非仅仅基于对有意识心智的神经生理基础的证明，也不是源于将机械论和反射性解释原则扩展到涵盖所有形式的动物和人类行为，而是基于对在没有意识的情况下有目的且协调的动物和人类行为的证明。鉴于赫胥黎对心智的自身论述，他将动物和人类描述为“有意识的自动机”的表述并不恰当。
