Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.
Psychol Sci. 2010 Oct;21(10):1438-45. doi: 10.1177/0956797610381504. Epub 2010 Aug 25.
Loss aversion in choice is commonly assumed to arise from the anticipation that losses have a greater effect on feelings than gains, but evidence for this assumption in research on judged feelings is mixed. We argue that loss aversion is present in judged feelings when people compare gains and losses and assess them on a common scale. But many situations in which people judge and express their feelings lack these features. When judging their feelings about an outcome, people naturally consider a context of similar outcomes for comparison (e.g., they consider losses against other losses). This process permits gains and losses to be normed separately and produces psychological scale units that may not be the same in size or meaning for gains and losses. Our experiments show loss aversion in judged feelings for tasks that encourage gain-loss comparisons, but not tasks that discourage them, particularly those using bipolar scales.
在选择中,人们通常假设损失规避是由于预期损失对感觉的影响比收益更大,但在对判断感觉的研究中,这一假设的证据是混杂的。我们认为,当人们比较收益和损失,并在一个共同的尺度上评估它们时,损失规避就存在于判断的感觉中。但在人们判断和表达自己的感觉的许多情况下,缺乏这些特征。当人们判断他们对某一结果的感觉时,他们自然会考虑到一个类似结果的背景来进行比较(例如,他们将损失与其他损失进行比较)。这个过程允许收益和损失分别进行标准化,并产生可能在大小或意义上对收益和损失不相同的心理量表单位。我们的实验表明,在鼓励得失比较的任务中,人们会对判断的感觉产生损失规避,但在不鼓励得失比较的任务中,特别是在使用两极量表的任务中,不会产生损失规避。