Goodwyn Erik
Minot Air Force Base, U.S. Air Force, USA.
J Anal Psychol. 2010 Sep;55(4):502-21. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5922.2010.01862.x.
The question of innateness has hounded Jungian psychology since Jung originally postulated the archetype as an a priori structure within the psyche. During his life and after his death he was continually accused of Lamarckianism and criticized for his theory that the archetypes existed as prior structures. More recently, with the advent of genetic research and the human genome project, the idea that psychological structures can be innate has come under even harsher criticism even within Jungian thought. There appears to be a growing consensus that Jung's idea of innate psychological structures was misguided, and that perhaps the archetype-as-such should be abandoned for more developmental and 'emergent' theories of the psyche. The purpose of this essay is to question this conclusion, and introduce some literature on psychological innateness that appears relevant to this discussion.
自从荣格最初将原型假定为心理中的一种先验结构以来,先天性问题一直困扰着荣格心理学。在他生前及死后,他不断被指责为拉马克主义,并因其认为原型作为先验结构存在的理论而受到批评。最近,随着基因研究和人类基因组计划的出现,即使在荣格派思想内部,心理结构可能是天生的这一观点也受到了更严厉的批评。似乎越来越多的人达成共识,即荣格关于天生心理结构的观点是错误的,也许应该抛弃这种原型概念,转而采用更多关于心理的发展性和“涌现性”理论。本文的目的是对这一结论提出质疑,并介绍一些与该讨论相关的关于心理先天性的文献。