Smythe William E, Baydala Angelina
J Anal Psychol. 2012 Feb;57(1):57-75. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5922.2011.01951.x.
Hermeneutics has been central to the practice of Jung's psychology from the beginning, although he never fully and consistently developed a hermeneutic method of inquiry and the literature addressing this aspect of his psychology is not extensive. In this paper(1) we undertake a critical re-examination of Jung's relationship to hermeneutic thought, based on his explicit references to hermeneutics in the Collected Works and his theoretical development of the notion of archetypes. Although Jung did not consistently formulate a hermeneutic approach to inquiry, his theoretical development of archetypes is rich in hermeneutic implications. In particular, his notion of the archetype as such can be understood hermeneutically as a form of non-conceptual background understanding. Some implications of this construal of archetypes for Jungian hermeneutics as a form of inquiry are considered.
从一开始,诠释学就在荣格心理学的实践中占据核心地位,尽管他从未全面且连贯地发展出一种诠释学探究方法,并且探讨其心理学这一方面的文献也并不丰富。在本文中,我们基于荣格在《全集》中对诠释学的明确提及以及他对原型概念的理论发展,对荣格与诠释学思想的关系进行批判性的重新审视。尽管荣格并未始终如一地制定出一种诠释学探究方法,但其对原型的理论发展却蕴含着丰富的诠释学意蕴。特别是,他的原型概念本身可以从诠释学角度理解为一种非概念性的背景理解形式。本文还考虑了这种对原型的理解对作为一种探究形式的荣格诠释学的一些影响。