Brooks Robin McCoy
Seattle, Washington, USA.
J Anal Psychol. 2011 Sep;56(4):492-513. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5922.2011.01925.x.
The author investigates the relation of Kant, Schopenhauer and Heidegger to Jung's attempts to formulate theory regarding the epistemological conundrum of what can and what cannot be known and what must remain uncertain. Jung's ambivalent use and misuse of Kant's division of the world into phenomenal and noumenal realms is highlighted in discussion of concepts such as the psychoid archetype which he called 'esse in anima' and his use of Schopenhauer's concept of 'will' to justify a transcendence of the psyche/soma divide in a postulation of a 'psychoid' realm. Finally, the author describes Jung's reaction to Heidegger's theories via his assertion that Heidegger's 'pre-given world design' was an alternate formulation of his concept of the archetypes. An underlying theme of the paper is a critique of Jung's foundationalism which perpetuates the myth of an isolated mind. This model of understanding subjectivity is briefly contrasted with Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' which focuses on a non-Cartesian 'understanding' of the 'presencing of being' in everyday social and historical contexts.
作者探究了康德、叔本华和海德格尔与荣格尝试就可知与不可知以及必须保持不确定的认识论难题构建理论之间的关系。在讨论诸如他称为“灵魂中的存在”的类心理原型概念，以及他运用叔本华的“意志”概念来论证在“类心理”领域的假设中超越心理/躯体划分时，荣格对康德将世界划分为现象界和本体界的矛盾运用与误用被凸显出来。最后，作者描述了荣格通过断言海德格尔的“先在的世界设计”是其原型概念的另一种表述，对海德格尔理论的反应。该论文的一个潜在主题是对荣格基础主义的批判，这种基础主义延续了孤立心灵的神话。这种理解主体性的模式与海德格尔的“基础本体论”进行了简要对比，后者关注在日常社会和历史背景中对“存在的在场”的非笛卡尔式“理解”。
