Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra ACT, Australia.
Disasters. 2011 Apr;35(2):287-307. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01218.x. Epub 2010 Nov 15.
This paper aims to contribute to the debate on the feasibility of the provision of micro flood insurance as an effective tool for spreading disaster risks in developing countries and examines the role of the institutional-organisational framework in assisting the design and implementation of such a micro flood insurance market. In Bangladesh, a private insurance market for property damage and livelihood risk due to natural disasters does not exist. Private insurance companies are reluctant to embark on an evidently unprofitable venture. Testing two different institutional-organisational models, this research reveals that the administration costs of micro-insurance play an important part in determining the long-term viability of micro flood insurance schemes. A government-facilitated process to overcome the differences observed in this study between the nonprofit micro-credit providers and profit-oriented private insurance companies is needed, building on the particular competence each party brings to the development of a viable micro flood insurance market through a public-private partnership.
本文旨在为关于提供小额洪水保险作为在发展中国家分散灾害风险的有效工具的可行性的辩论做出贡献,并探讨了制度组织框架在协助设计和实施此类小额洪水保险市场方面的作用。在孟加拉国,不存在因自然灾害导致财产损失和生计风险的私人保险市场。私营保险公司不愿从事显然无利可图的风险。本研究测试了两种不同的制度组织模式,结果表明,小额保险的管理成本在确定小额洪水保险计划的长期可行性方面起着重要作用。需要建立一个由政府推动的过程,以克服本研究中非营利小额信贷机构和盈利性私营保险公司之间的差异,借鉴各方通过公私伙伴关系为建立可行的小额洪水保险市场带来的特殊能力。