Department of Philosophy, The University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence, KS 66045, USA.
J Med Ethics. 2011 Jun;37(6):384-8. doi: 10.1136/jme.2010.038703. Epub 2011 Feb 18.
According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.
卡森·斯特朗认为，未来价值论对杀人之错的说明存在反例。埃齐奥·迪努奇则不同意。他们的分歧在于未来价值与我们的未来是否具有相同的概念。不幸的是，这两个概念都很模糊，这至少在一定程度上解释了分歧的存在。我认为这两个概念都可以以看似合理的方式加以澄清，并使之等同。斯特朗声称存在对杀人之错的更好说明。我表明那些替代说明都不令人满意。
