Centre for Professional Ethics (PEAK), Chancellor's Building, Keele University, Keele ST5 5BG, UK.
J Med Ethics. 2013 May;39(5):e15-8. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2012-100958.
Two notable limitations exist on the use of personhood arguments in establishing moral status. Firstly, although the attribution of personhood may give us sufficient reason to grant something moral status, it is not a necessary condition. Secondly, even if a person is that which has the 'highest' moral status, this does not mean that any interests of a person are justifiable grounds to kill something that has a 'lower' moral status. Additional justification is needed to overcome a basic wrongness associated with killing something possessing moral status. There are clear arguments already available in this regard in the case of a foetus that are not available in the case of a newborn infant. Hence, there is scope to consistently hold that abortion may be permissible but that after-birth abortion may not be permissible.
在确立道德地位时，人格论的使用存在两个显著的局限性。首先，尽管赋予人格可能使我们有充分的理由赋予某物道德地位，但这不是必要条件。其次，即使一个人具有“最高”的道德地位，这并不意味着一个人的任何利益都是杀死具有“较低”道德地位的东西的合理理由。需要额外的理由来克服与杀死具有道德地位的东西相关的基本错误。在这方面，已经有明确的论据可用于胎儿，但新生儿的情况则不然。因此，有理由一致认为堕胎可能是允许的，但产后堕胎可能是不允许的。
