University of Basel, Department of Psychology, Missionsstrasse 60-64, 4055 Basel, Switzerland.
Cognition. 2011 Jun;119(3):454-8. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.01.018. Epub 2011 Feb 26.
Do moral judgments hinge on the time available to render them? According to a recent dual-process model of moral judgment, moral dilemmas that engage emotional processes are likely to result in fast deontological gut reactions. In contrast, consequentialist responses that tot up lives saved and lost in response to such dilemmas would require cognitive control to override the initial response. Cognitive control, however, takes time. In two experiments, we manipulated the time available to arrive at moral judgments in two ways: by allotting a fixed short or large amount of time, and by nudging people to answer swiftly or to deliberate thoroughly. We found that faster responses indeed lead to more deontological responses among those moral dilemmas in which the killing of one to save many necessitates manhandling an innocent person and in which this action is depicted as a means to an end. Thus, our results are the first demonstration that inhibiting cognitive control through manipulations of time alters moral judgments.
道德判断是否取决于做出判断的时间？根据最近的道德判断双加工模型，涉及情感过程的道德困境很可能导致快速的道义直觉反应。相比之下，对这类困境做出的功利主义反应需要认知控制来克服初始反应。然而，认知控制需要时间。在两项实验中，我们通过两种方式来操纵人们做出道德判断的时间：分配固定的短时间或长时间，以及引导人们快速回答或深思熟虑。我们发现，在那些需要操纵一个无辜的人来拯救许多人并将此行为视为达到目的的手段的道德困境中，更快的反应确实会导致更多的道义反应。因此，我们的结果首次证明，通过时间操纵抑制认知控制会改变道德判断。
