Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA.
Prog Brain Res. 2013;202:187-96. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-444-62604-2.00011-3.
According to dual-process theories, moral judgments are the result of two competing processes: a fast, automatic, affect-driven process and a slow, deliberative, reason-based process. Accordingly, these models make clear and testable predictions about the influence of each system. Although a small number of studies have attempted to examine each process independently in the context of moral judgment, no study has yet tried to experimentally manipulate both processes within a single study. In this chapter, a well-established "mode-of-thought" priming technique was used to place participants in either an experiential/emotional or analytic mode while completing a task in which participants provide judgments about a series of moral dilemmas. We predicted that individuals primed analytically would make more utilitarian responses than control participants, while emotional priming would lead to less utilitarian responses. Support was found for both of these predictions. Implications of these findings for dual-process theories of moral judgment will be discussed.
根据双过程理论，道德判断是两个竞争过程的结果：一个快速、自动、受情感驱动的过程和一个缓慢、深思熟虑、基于理性的过程。因此，这些模型对每个系统的影响做出了清晰和可检验的预测。尽管少数研究试图在道德判断的背景下独立地检验每个过程，但没有研究试图在单个研究中实验性地操纵这两个过程。在这一章中，我们使用一种成熟的“思维模式”启动技术，在参与者完成一系列道德困境判断任务时，将他们置于体验/情感或分析模式中。我们预测，被分析性启动的个体将比对照组做出更多功利主义的反应，而情绪启动则会导致较少的功利主义反应。这两个预测都得到了支持。这些发现对道德判断的双过程理论的意义将在讨论中进行阐述。
