Szolnoki Attila, Szabó György, Perc Matjaž
Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, Post Office Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter Phys. 2011 Mar;83(3 Pt 2):036101. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevE.83.036101. Epub 2011 Mar 7.
The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool punishers as the three competing strategies. Fines and costs of pool punishment are considered as the two main parameters determining the stationary distributions of strategies on the square lattice. Each player collects a payoff from five five-person public goods games, and the evolution of strategies is subsequently governed by imitation based on pairwise comparisons at a low level of noise. The impact of pool punishment on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is significantly different from that reported previously for peer punishment. Representative phase diagrams reveal remarkably rich behavior, depending also on the value of the synergy factor that characterizes the efficiency of investments payed into the common pool. Besides traditional single- and two-strategy stationary states, a rock-paper-scissors type of cyclic dominance can emerge in strikingly different ways.
通过评估空间公共物品博弈中的稳态来研究制度化惩罚的效率，该博弈包含无条件背叛者、合作者和合作式群体惩罚者这三种竞争策略。罚款和群体惩罚成本被视为决定方形晶格上策略稳态分布的两个主要参数。每个参与者从五个五人公共物品博弈中获得收益，随后策略的演化由低噪声水平下基于两两比较的模仿来控制。群体惩罚对结构化群体中合作演化的影响与之前报道的同伴惩罚的影响显著不同。代表性的相图揭示了非常丰富的行为，这也取决于表征投入公共池的投资效率的协同因子的值。除了传统的单策略和双策略稳态外，剪刀石头布类型的循环优势可以以截然不同的方式出现。
