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与收益差异成正比的概率性群体惩罚比之前的群体和同伴惩罚更有效。

The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.

作者信息

Ohdaira Tetsushi

机构信息

Institute of Information and Media, Aoyama Gakuin University, 5-10-1 Fuchinobe, Chuo-ku, Sagamihara-city, Kanagawa, 252-5258, Japan.

出版信息

Sci Rep. 2022 Apr 22;12(1):6604. doi: 10.1038/s41598-022-10582-5.

Abstract

The public goods game is a multiplayer version of the prisoner's dilemma game. In the public goods game, punishment on defectors is necessary to encourage cooperation. There are two types of punishment: peer punishment and pool punishment. Comparing pool punishment with peer punishment, pool punishment is disadvantageous in comparison with peer punishment because pool punishment incurs fixed costs especially if second-order free riders (those who invest in public goods but do not punish defectors) are not punished. In order to eliminate such a flaw of pool punishment, this study proposes the probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff. In the proposed pool punishment, each punisher pays the cost to the punishment pool with the probability proportional to the difference of payoff between his/her payoff and the average payoff of his/her opponents. Comparing the proposed pool punishment with previous pool and peer punishment, in pool punishment of previous studies, cooperators who do not punish defectors become dominant instead of pool punishers with fixed costs. However, in the proposed pool punishment, more punishers and less cooperators coexist, and such state is more robust against the invasion of defectors due to mutation than those of previous pool and peer punishment. The average payoff is also comparable to peer punishment of previous studies.

摘要

公共品博弈是囚徒困境博弈的多人版本。在公共品博弈中,对背叛者进行惩罚对于鼓励合作是必要的。惩罚有两种类型:同伴惩罚和群体惩罚。将群体惩罚与同伴惩罚相比较,群体惩罚与同伴惩罚相比处于劣势,因为群体惩罚会产生固定成本,尤其是在二阶搭便车者(那些投资公共品但不惩罚背叛者的人)未受到惩罚的情况下。为了消除群体惩罚的这种缺陷,本研究提出了与收益差异成比例的概率性群体惩罚。在所提出的群体惩罚中,每个惩罚者以与他/她自己的收益和对手平均收益之间的收益差异成比例的概率向惩罚池支付成本。将所提出的群体惩罚与先前的群体惩罚和同伴惩罚相比较,在先前研究的群体惩罚中,不惩罚背叛者的合作者会占据主导地位,而不是有固定成本的群体惩罚者。然而,在所提出的群体惩罚中,更多的惩罚者和更少的合作者共存,并且与先前的群体惩罚和同伴惩罚相比,这种状态对于因突变而导致的背叛者入侵具有更强的抵抗力。平均收益也与先前研究中的同伴惩罚相当。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/9933/9033862/dd2af60f7137/41598_2022_10582_Fig1_HTML.jpg

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