Marine Science Institute, University of California, Santa Barbara, California 93106, USA.
Ecol Appl. 2011 Mar;21(2):350-62. doi: 10.1890/09-1188.1.
Regulation of fisheries using spatial property rights can alleviate competition for high-value patches that hinders economic efficiency in quota-based, rights-based, and open-access management programs. However, efficiency gains erode when delineation of spatial rights constitutes incomplete ownership of the resource, thereby degrading its local value and promoting overexploitation. Incomplete ownership may be particularly prevalent in the spatial management of mobile fishery species. We developed a game-theoretic bioeconomic model of spatial property rights representing territorial user rights fisheries (TURF) management of nearshore marine fish and invertebrate species with mobile adult and larval life history stages. Strategic responses by fisheries in neighboring management units result in overexploitation of the stock and reduced yields for each fishery compared with those attainable without resource mobility or with coordination or sole control in fishing effort. High dispersal potential of the larval stage, a common trait among nearshore fishery species, coupled with scaling of management units to only capture adult mobility, a common characteristic of many nearshore TURF programs, in particular substantially reduced stock levels and yields. In a case study of hypothetical TURF programs of nearshore fish and invertebrate species, management units needed to be tens of kilometers in alongshore length to minimize larval export and generate reasonable returns to fisheries. Cooperation and quota regulations represent solutions to the problem that need to be quantified in cost and integrated into the determination of the acceptability of spatial property rights management of fisheries.
利用空间产权来管理渔业，可以缓解基于配额、基于权利和开放式管理方案中阻碍经济效益的高价值斑块竞争。然而，当空间权利的划定构成资源不完全所有权时，效率的提高就会受到侵蚀，从而降低资源的本地价值，并促进过度开发。在移动渔业物种的空间管理中，不完全所有权可能特别普遍。我们开发了一个基于博弈论的生物经济模型，代表了具有移动成体和幼虫生活史阶段的近岸海洋鱼类和无脊椎动物的领土使用者权利渔业（TURF）管理。相邻管理单位渔业的战略反应导致过度开发资源，与没有资源流动性或协调或单独控制捕捞努力相比，每个渔业的产量降低。幼虫阶段的高扩散潜力是近岸渔业物种的共同特征，再加上管理单位只捕获成体的移动性，这是许多近岸 TURF 计划的共同特征，特别是大大降低了种群水平和产量。在近岸鱼类和无脊椎动物的假设 TURF 计划案例研究中，管理单位需要有数十公里的岸线长度，以最小化幼虫的出口，并为渔业产生合理的回报。合作和配额法规是解决问题的办法，需要在成本中量化，并纳入渔业空间产权管理的可接受性的确定。
