Department of International Studies, The University of Tokyo, 5-1-5 Kashiwanoha, Chiba, 277-0459, Japan.
Institute for Asian and Oceanian Studies, Kyushu University, 744 Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka, 819-0395, Japan.
J Environ Manage. 2022 Sep 1;317:115360. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2022.115360. Epub 2022 Jun 9.
Overfishing is the main threat to sustainable fisheries and the loss of marine biodiversity. The race-to-fish phenomenon is a central driver of overfishing, and it prevails from small-scale to large-scale management regardless of whether spatial-right-based fisheries management has been implemented to ensure the ownership of fishery resources. In practice, the fishing grounds of resource users create complex configurations. Systematic understanding of harvesting competition across these configurations is necessary to promote sustainable fisheries management. Here, we developed a spatially-explicit model to analyze various scenarios of harvesting competition between two user groups using a game-theoretic approach. We found that realized harvesting competition was largely determined by the configuration of fishing grounds and an ecological mechanism where the ecological rescue effect could escalate harvesting competition, leading to a low population size. Our results also suggested that the implementation of voluntary no-take marine protected areas could largely mitigate harvesting competition. This suggests that the coordination of user groups is essential to resolve the race-to-fish.
过度捕捞是可持续渔业和海洋生物多样性丧失的主要威胁。捕捞竞赛现象是过度捕捞的核心驱动因素，无论是否实施了基于空间权利的渔业管理来确保渔业资源的所有权，它都普遍存在于从小规模到大规模的管理中。在实践中，资源使用者的渔场形成了复杂的配置。为了促进可持续渔业管理，有必要系统地了解这些配置中的捕捞竞争。在这里，我们使用博弈论方法开发了一个空间显式模型，以分析两个用户群体之间的各种捕捞竞争情景。我们发现，实际的捕捞竞争在很大程度上取决于渔场的配置和一种生态机制，其中生态救助效应可能会加剧捕捞竞争，导致种群数量减少。我们的研究结果还表明，实施自愿性的无捕捞海洋保护区可以在很大程度上缓解捕捞竞争。这表明协调用户群体对于解决捕捞竞赛至关重要。
