Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 135 Duke Marine Lab Road, Beaufort, North Carolina, 28516, USA.
Environmental Studies Program, University of Colorado, Boulder, 4001 Discovery Drive Boulder, Colorado, 80303, USA.
Ecol Appl. 2020 Jan;30(1):e02022. doi: 10.1002/eap.2022. Epub 2019 Nov 20.
Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) are coastal territories assigned to fishermen for the exclusive extraction of marine resources. Recent evidence shows that the incentives that arise from these systems can improve fisheries sustainability. Although research on TURFs has increased in recent years, important questions regarding the social and ecological dynamics underlying their success remain largely unanswered. In particular, in order to create new successful TURFs, it is critical to comprehend how fish movement over different distances affects the development of sustainable fishing practices within a TURF. In theory, excessive spillover outside a TURF will generate incentives to overharvest. However, many TURFs have proven successful even when targeted species move over distances far greater than the TURF's size. A common attribute among some of these successful systems is the presence of inter-TURF cooperation arrangements. This raises the question of how different levels and types of cooperation affect the motivations for overharvesting driven by the movement of fish outside the TURF. In this paper, we examine equilibrium yields under different levels of inter-TURF cooperation (from partial to full) and varying degrees of asymmetry across TURFs of both biological capacity and benefit-sharing. We find that partial cooperation can improve yields even with an unequal distribution of shared benefits and asymmetric carrying capacity. However, cooperation arrangements are unstable if the sharing agreement and biological asymmetries are misaligned. Remarkably, we find that asymmetry in the system can lead to the creation of voluntary no-take zones.
渔业专属区使用权（TURFs）是分配给渔民的沿海领土，用于独家捕捞海洋资源。最近的证据表明，这些制度所产生的激励措施可以提高渔业的可持续性。尽管近年来关于 TURFs 的研究有所增加，但关于其成功背后的社会和生态动态的重要问题仍然在很大程度上没有得到解答。特别是，为了创建新的成功的 TURFs，了解鱼类在不同距离上的移动如何影响 TURF 内可持续捕捞实践的发展是至关重要的。从理论上讲，TURF 之外的过度溢出会产生过度捕捞的激励。然而，许多 TURFs 已经被证明是成功的，即使目标物种的移动距离远远超过 TURF 的大小。这些成功系统的一个共同特征是存在跨 TURF 的合作安排。这就提出了一个问题，即不同层次和类型的合作如何影响由于鱼类在 TURF 之外的移动而产生的过度捕捞动机。在本文中，我们研究了在不同程度的跨 TURF 合作（从部分到完全）下的均衡产量，以及在生物能力和利益分享方面 TURF 之间的不同程度的不对称性。我们发现，即使在共享利益分配不均和承载能力不对称的情况下，部分合作也可以提高产量。然而，如果共享协议和生物不对称性不匹配，合作安排是不稳定的。值得注意的是，我们发现系统的不对称性可能导致自愿的禁渔区的出现。
