Cohen Anna-Lisa, Kantner Justin, Dixon Roger A, Lindsay D Stephen
Department of Psychology, Yeshiva University, New York, NY 10033, USA.
Exp Psychol. 2011;58(6):425-33. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000110.
Intentions have been shown to be more accessible (e.g., more quickly and accurately recalled) compared to other sorts of to-be-remembered information; a result termed an intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). In the current study, we demonstrate an intention interference effect (IIE) in which color-naming performance in a Stroop task was slower for words belonging to an intention that participants had to remember to carry out (Do-the-Task condition) versus an intention that did not have to be executed (Ignore-the-Task condition). In previous work (e.g., Cohen et al., 2005), having a prospective intention in mind was confounded with carrying a memory load. In Experiment 1, we added a digit-retention task to control for effects of cognitive load. In Experiment 2, we eliminated the memory confound in a new way, by comparing intention-related and control words within each trial. Results from both Experiments 1 and 2 revealed an IIE suggesting that interference is very specific to the intention, not just to a memory load.
与其他类型的待记忆信息相比,意图已被证明更容易被获取(例如,回忆得更快且更准确);这一结果被称为意图优势效应(戈施克和库尔,1993)。在当前研究中,我们证明了一种意图干扰效应(IIE),即在斯特鲁普任务中,对于属于参与者必须记住要执行的意图(执行任务条件)的单词,其颜色命名表现比不必执行的意图(忽略任务条件)的单词更慢。在先前的研究(例如,科恩等人,2005)中,脑海中有一个前瞻性意图与承担记忆负荷相混淆。在实验1中,我们增加了一个数字保留任务以控制认知负荷的影响。在实验2中,我们以一种新的方式消除了记忆混淆,即在每个试验中比较与意图相关的单词和控制单词。实验1和实验2的结果都揭示了一种意图干扰效应,表明干扰非常特定于意图,而不仅仅是记忆负荷。