Tonkens Ryan
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
J Med Philos. 2011 Jun;36(3):274-95. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhr012. Epub 2011 May 19.
The purpose of this paper is to unveil one problem that surrounds the debate over the moral standing of prenatal genetic enhancement (PGE) and to outline a solution to it. The problem is that we have no way to test our speculations about the consequences of prenatal enhancement without begging the question about the moral permissibility of enhancing unborn children. The only way to empirically support our speculations about the consequences of prenatal enhancement is to resort to ethically worrisome (and radical) experimental genetic research. The suggested solution to this problem is to focus on the character of good parents. The virtue of parental wisdom is introduced and used as a basis for evaluating PGE. It is argued that good parents have good reason not to condone PGE for their children (in very many cases), especially as part of the first wave of genetically altered humans.
本文的目的是揭示围绕产前基因增强（PGE）道德地位辩论的一个问题，并概述其解决方案。问题在于，在不回避增强未出生儿童道德可允许性问题的情况下，我们无法检验关于产前增强后果的推测。从经验上支持我们对产前增强后果推测的唯一方法是诉诸在伦理上令人担忧（且激进）的实验性基因研究。针对这个问题提出的解决方案是关注好父母的特质。引入了父母智慧的美德，并将其作为评估PGE的基础。有人认为，好父母有充分的理由不为他们的孩子宽恕PGE（在很多情况下），尤其是作为第一代基因改造人类的一部分。
