Fins Joseph J
Division of Medical Ethics, New York Presbyterian-Weill Cornell Medical Center, 435 East 70th Street, Suite 4-J, New York, NY 10021, USA.
Trans Am Clin Climatol Assoc. 2011;122:336-46.
The advent of powerful neuroimaging tools such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) has begun to redefine how we diagnose, define, and understand disorders of consciousness such as the vegetative and minimally conscious states. In my paper, I review how research using these methods is both elucidating these brain states and creating diagnostic dilemmas related to their classification as the specificity and sensitivity of traditional behavior-based assessments are weighed against sensitive but not yet fully validated neuroimaging data. I also consider how these methods are being studied as potential communication vectors for therapeutic use in subjects who heretofore have been thought to be unresponsive or minimally conscious. I conclude by considering the ethical challenges posed by novel diagnostic and therapeutic neuroimaging applications and contextualize these scientific developments against the broader needs of patients and families touched by severe brain injury.
功能磁共振成像(fMRI)和正电子发射断层扫描(PET)等强大的神经成像工具的出现,已开始重新定义我们对诸如植物状态和微意识状态等意识障碍的诊断、定义和理解方式。在我的论文中,我回顾了使用这些方法的研究如何既能阐明这些脑状态,又会产生与它们的分类相关的诊断困境,因为传统基于行为的评估的特异性和敏感性要与敏感但尚未完全验证的神经成像数据相权衡。我还考虑了这些方法如何被研究作为治疗手段,用于那些迄今为止被认为无反应或仅有微意识的受试者的潜在沟通载体。最后,我思考了新型诊断和治疗性神经成像应用所带来的伦理挑战,并将这些科学进展置于受严重脑损伤影响的患者及其家庭的更广泛需求背景下进行考量。