人类尊严在瑞士法律体系中的作用。为人类尊严的二元概念进行论证。

School of Law of the University of Lucerne, Switzerland.

J Int Bioethique. 2010 Dec;21(4):83-91, 161-2. doi: 10.3917/jib.214.0083.

The particular history and codification of human dignity in the Swiss Constitution provide grounds for distinguishing two fundamentally different interpretations and functions of human dignity: on the one hand, human dignity as an inviolable fundamental right, on the other hand, as an objective constitutional principle. As a fundamental right, human dignity protects the need of the individual to be recognised in his own, subjective value. This need is so fundamental for human well-being that it merits absolute protection. From this there follows an absolute prohibition of human humiliation by means of torture, discrimination, slavery or in other ways. In contrast, as a constitutional principle, human dignity protects the objective value of the human being as a person, that is to say, the objective value of all human life that is a person, will be a person (embryo and fetus) and has been a person (dead body). The protection of such an objective value is in the interest of a multitude of persons whose moral judgements generate that value. As a constitutional principle, human dignity therefore protects a public interest. The protection conferred by such a constitutional principle is significantly weaker than the protection afforded by human dignity as a fundamental right.

瑞士宪法中人类尊严的特殊历史和编纂为区分人类尊严的两种根本不同的解释和功能提供了依据

一方面，人类尊严作为一项不可侵犯的基本权利；另一方面，作为一项客观的宪法原则。作为一项基本权利，人类尊严保护个人在其自身主观价值中得到认可的需求。这种需求对人类福祉至关重要，值得绝对保护。由此产生了绝对禁止通过酷刑、歧视、奴役或其他方式对人进行羞辱。相比之下，作为一项宪法原则，人类尊严保护人作为人的客观价值，也就是说，所有作为人、将成为人（胚胎和胎儿）以及曾经是人（尸体）的人类生命的客观价值。对这种客观价值的保护符合众多产生该价值的道德判断者的利益。因此，作为一项宪法原则，人类尊严保护公共利益。这种宪法原则所赋予的保护明显弱于人类尊严作为一项基本权利所提供的保护。