Chetty Raj, Friedman John N, Olsen Tore, Pistaferri Luigi
Harvard University and NBER.
Q J Econ. 2011 May 1;126(2):749-804. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjr013.
We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.
我们表明，税收对劳动力供给的影响是由工人的调整成本与企业设定的工时限制之间的相互作用所塑造的。我们构建了一个模型，在该模型中企业发布具有工时要求的工作机会，而工人为找到工作支付搜寻成本。我们通过使用丹麦税收记录分析弯折点处的聚集情况，给出了支持该模型三个预测的证据。第一，更大的弯折点会产生更大的应税收入弹性。第二，适用于更大工人群体的弯折点会产生更大的弹性。第三，工作机会的分布经过调整，以在均衡状态下匹配工人的总体税收偏好。我们的结果表明，宏观弹性可能远大于使用标准微观计量方法获得的估计值。
