Aron-Dine Aviva, Einav Liran, Finkelstein Amy, Cullen Mark
Office of Management and Budget.
Stanford University and NBER.
Rev Econ Stat. 2015 Oct;97(4):725-741. doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00518.
Using data from employer-provided health insurance and Medicare Part D, we investigate whether healthcare utilization responds to the dynamic incentives created by the nonlinear nature of health insurance contracts. We exploit the fact that, because annual coverage usually resets every January, individuals who join a plan later in the year face the same initial ("spot") price of healthcare but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price. We find a statistically significant response of initial utilization to the future price, rejecting the null that individuals respond only to the spot price. We discuss implications for analysis of moral hazard in health insurance.
利用雇主提供的医疗保险和医疗保险D部分的数据，我们研究了医疗保健利用率是否对医疗保险合同非线性性质所产生的动态激励做出反应。我们利用这样一个事实，即由于年度保险通常在每年1月重置，当年晚些时候加入计划的个人面临相同的初始（“即期”）医疗保健价格，但预期的年末（“未来”）价格更高。我们发现初始利用率对未来价格有统计学上显著的反应，拒绝了个人仅对即期价格做出反应的原假设。我们讨论了对医疗保险中道德风险分析的影响。
