Monash Alfred Psychiatry Research Centre, School of Psychology and Psychiatry, Monash University and the Alfred Hospital, Melbourne, VIC 3004, Australia.
Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 2012 Jan;36(1):645-57. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.09.006. Epub 2011 Oct 1.
Recent research suggests the observation or imagination of somatosensory stimulation in another (e.g., touch or pain) can induce a similar somatosensory experience in oneself. Some researchers have presented this experience as a type of synaesthesia, whereas others consider it an extreme experience of an otherwise normal perception. Here, we present an argument that these descriptions are not mutually exclusive. They may describe the extreme version of the normal process of understanding somatosensation in others. It becomes synaesthesia, however, when this process results in a conscious experience comparable to the observed person's state. We describe these experiences as 'mirror-sensory synaesthesia'; a type of synaesthesia identified by its distinct social component where the induced synaesthetic experience is a similar sensory experience to that perceived in another person. Through the operationalisation of this intriguing experience as synaesthesia, existing neurobiological models of synaesthesia can be used as a framework to explore how mechanisms may act upon social cognitive processes to produce conscious experiences similar to another person's observed state.
最近的研究表明,观察或想象另一个人的躯体感觉刺激(例如触摸或疼痛)可以在自己身上引起类似的躯体感觉体验。一些研究人员将这种体验描述为一种联觉,而另一些人则认为这是一种正常感知的极端体验。在这里,我们提出一个论点,即这些描述并不相互排斥。它们可能描述了理解他人躯体感觉的正常过程的极端版本。然而,当这个过程导致一种与被观察者状态相当的意识体验时,它就变成了联觉。我们将这些体验描述为“镜像感觉联觉”;这是一种联觉,其独特的社会组成部分在于,诱导的联觉体验是与另一个人感知到的相似的感觉体验。通过将这种有趣的体验操作化为联觉,现有的联觉神经生物学模型可以作为一个框架,探索机制如何作用于社会认知过程,从而产生类似于另一个人观察到的状态的意识体验。