Institute of Work and Organizational Psychology, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland.
J Appl Psychol. 2012 Jul;97(4):719-38. doi: 10.1037/a0026078. Epub 2011 Oct 31.
Personnel selection involves exchanges of information between job market actors (applicants and organizations). These actors do not have an incentive to exchange accurate information about their ability and commitment to the employment relationship unless it is to their advantage. This state of affairs explains numerous phenomena in personnel selection (e.g., faking). Signaling theory describes a mechanism by which parties with partly conflicting interests (and thus an incentive for deception) can nevertheless exchange accurate information. We apply signaling theory to personnel selection, distinguishing between adaptive relationships between applicants and organizations, among applicants, and among organizations. In each case, repeated adaptations and counteradaptations between actors can lead to situations of equilibrium or escalation (arms races). We show that viewing personnel selection as a network of adaptive relationships among job market actors enables an understanding of both classic and underexplored micro- and macro-level selection phenomena and their dynamic interactions.
人员选拔涉及到求职者和用人单位等市场参与者之间的信息交流。除非对他们有利，否则这些参与者没有动机去交流有关他们能力和对雇佣关系的承诺的准确信息。这种情况解释了人员选拔中的许多现象（例如，造假）。信号传递理论描述了一种机制，通过这种机制，利益部分冲突的各方（因此有欺骗的动机）仍然可以交流准确的信息。我们将信号传递理论应用于人员选拔，区分了求职者与用人单位之间、求职者之间以及用人单位之间的适应性关系。在每种情况下，参与者之间的反复适应和反适应都可能导致平衡或升级（军备竞赛）的情况。我们表明，将人员选拔视为求职者和用人单位之间的适应性关系网络，可以帮助理解经典的和研究不足的微观和宏观层面的选拔现象及其动态相互作用。
