Department of Cognitive, Linguistic and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA.
Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2012 Nov;7(8):888-95. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr072. Epub 2011 Nov 22.
Ordinary people make moral judgments that are consistent with philosophical and legal principles. Do those judgments derive from the controlled application of principles, or do the principles derive from automatic judgments? As a case study, we explore the tendency to judge harmful actions morally worse than harmful omissions (the 'omission effect') using fMRI. Because ordinary people readily and spontaneously articulate this moral distinction it has been suggested that principled reasoning may drive subsequent judgments. If so, people who exhibit the largest omission effect should exhibit the greatest activation in regions associated with controlled cognition. Yet, we observed the opposite relationship: activation in the frontoparietal control network was associated with condemning harmful omissions-that is, with overriding the omission effect. These data suggest that the omission effect arises automatically, without the application of controlled cognition. However, controlled cognition is apparently used to overcome automatic judgment processes in order to condemn harmful omissions.
普通人做出的道德判断与哲学和法律原则一致。这些判断是源于原则的受控应用,还是源于自动判断?作为一个案例研究,我们使用 fMRI 探索判断有害行为比有害不作为(“不作为效应”)更道德的倾向。由于普通人很容易自发地表达这种道德区别,因此有人认为,原则推理可能会驱动随后的判断。如果是这样,那么表现出最大不作为效应的人应该在与控制认知相关的区域表现出最大的激活。然而,我们观察到了相反的关系:额顶控制网络的激活与谴责有害的不作为有关,也就是说,与克服不作为效应有关。这些数据表明,不作为效应是自动产生的,而不需要进行受控认知。然而,为了谴责有害的不作为,显然需要使用受控认知来克服自动判断过程。