Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Medical School, RWTH Aachen University, Aachen, Germany.
Brain Struct Funct. 2012 Oct;217(4):783-96. doi: 10.1007/s00429-012-0380-y. Epub 2012 Jan 24.
Morally judicious behavior forms the fabric of human sociality. Here, we sought to investigate neural activity associated with different facets of moral thought. Previous research suggests that the cognitive and emotional sources of moral decisions might be closely related to theory of mind, an abstract-cognitive skill, and empathy, a rapid-emotional skill. That is, moral decisions are thought to crucially refer to other persons' representation of intentions and behavioral outcomes as well as (vicariously experienced) emotional states. We thus hypothesized that moral decisions might be implemented in brain areas engaged in 'theory of mind' and empathy. This assumption was tested by conducting a large-scale activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies, which assessed 2,607 peak coordinates from 247 experiments in 1,790 participants. The brain areas that were consistently involved in moral decisions showed more convergence with the ALE analysis targeting theory of mind versus empathy. More specifically, the neurotopographical overlap between morality and empathy disfavors a role of affective sharing during moral decisions. Ultimately, our results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.
道德判断行为构成了人类社会性的基础。在这里,我们试图探究与道德思维不同方面相关的神经活动。先前的研究表明,道德决策的认知和情感来源可能与心理理论密切相关,心理理论是一种抽象认知技能,与同理心相关,同理心是一种快速的情感技能。也就是说,道德决策被认为与他人的意图和行为结果的表现(替代性体验)以及情感状态密切相关。因此,我们假设道德决策可能是在参与心理理论和同理心的大脑区域中实施的。通过对评估 1790 名参与者 247 个实验中的 2607 个峰值坐标的神经影像学研究进行大规模激活似然估计(ALE)荟萃分析,对这一假设进行了测试。在道德决策中始终涉及的大脑区域与针对心理理论的 ALE 分析具有更多的一致性,而不是同理心。更具体地说,道德和同理心之间的神经拓扑重叠不利于在道德决策期间进行情感共享。最终,我们的研究结果为道德决策的神经基础可能是全域的,并且可能可以分解为认知和情感子系统提供了证据。