Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA.
Mem Cognit. 2012 Jul;40(5):769-78. doi: 10.3758/s13421-012-0188-2.
In two experiments, we established a new phenomenon in reasoning from disjunctions of the grammatical form either A or else B, where A and B are clauses. When individuals have to assess whether pairs of assertions can be true at the same time, they tend to focus on the truth of each clause of an exclusive disjunction (and ignore the concurrent falsity of the other clause). Hence, they succumb to illusions of consistency and of inconsistency with pairs consisting of a disjunction and a conjunction (Experiment 1), and with simpler problems consisting of pairs of disjunctions, such as eIther there is a pie or else there is a cake and Either there isn't a pie or else there is a cake (Experiment 2), that appear to be consistent with one another, but in fact are not. These results corroborate the theory that reasoning depends on envisaging models of possibilities.
在两项实验中，我们在由语法形式 A 或 B 的析取构成的推理中确立了一种新现象，其中 A 和 B 是从句。当个体必须评估一对断言是否可以同时为真时，他们往往会专注于排他析取的每个从句的真实性（并忽略另一个从句的同时虚假性）。因此，他们容易受到一致性和不一致性的错觉的影响，这些错觉涉及由析取和合取组成的对（实验 1），以及涉及由简单的析取对组成的问题，例如要么有一个派，要么有一个蛋糕，要么没有一个派，要么有一个蛋糕（实验 2），这些问题似乎彼此一致，但实际上并非如此。这些结果证实了推理取决于设想可能性模型的理论。
