Kayali Tamara, Iqbal Furhan
Centre for Family Research, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RF, UK.
Med Health Care Philos. 2013 Feb;16(1):31-9. doi: 10.1007/s11019-012-9409-5.
Fredrik Svenaeus has applied Heidegger's concept of 'being-in-the-world' to health and illness. Health, Svenaeus contends, is a state of 'homelike being-in-the-world' characterised by being 'balanced' and 'in-tune' with the world. Illness, on the other hand, is a state of 'unhomelike being-in-the-world' characterised by being 'off-balance' and alienated from our own bodies. This paper applies the phenomenological concepts presented by Svenaeus to cases from a study of depression. In doing so, we show that while they can certainly enrich our understanding of depression, they can also reveal a clash between some societal definitions of illness and the individual's definition. Phenomenological analysis may thus cause us to question what we mean, or think should be meant, by the terms 'health' and 'illness'.
弗雷德里克·斯韦奈厄斯将海德格尔的“在世存在”概念应用于健康与疾病领域。斯韦奈厄斯认为，健康是一种“如在家般的在世存在”状态，其特征是与世界“平衡”且“协调一致”。另一方面，疾病是一种“不像在家的在世存在”状态，其特征是“失衡”且与我们自身的身体相疏离。本文将斯韦奈厄斯提出的现象学概念应用于一项抑郁症研究中的案例。通过这样做，我们表明，虽然这些概念肯定能丰富我们对抑郁症的理解，但它们也能揭示出一些疾病的社会定义与个体定义之间的冲突。现象学分析可能因此促使我们质疑“健康”和“疾病”这些术语的含义，或者我们认为它们应该具有的含义。
