Buratti Sandra, Allwood Carl Martin
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Box 500, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden.
Cogn Process. 2012 Aug;13(3):243-53. doi: 10.1007/s10339-012-0440-5. Epub 2012 Apr 4.
Can people improve the realism of their confidence judgments about the correctness of their episodic memory reports by deselecting the least realistic judgments? An assumption of Koriat and Goldsmith's (Psychol Rev 103:490-517, 1996) model is that confidence judgments regulate the reporting of memory reports. We tested whether this assumption generalizes to the regulation of the realism (accuracy) of confidence judgments. In two experiments, 270 adults in separate conditions answered 50 recognition and recall questions about the contents of a just-seen video. After each answer, they made confidence judgments about the answer's correctness. In Experiment 1, the participants in the recognition conditions significantly increased their absolute bias when they excluded 15 questions. In Experiment 2, the participants in the recall condition significantly improved their calibration. The results indicate that recall, more than recognition, offers valid cues for participants to increase the realism of their report. However, the effects were small with only weak support for the conclusion that people have some ability to regulate the realism in their confidence judgments.
人们能否通过取消最不现实的判断来提高其对情景记忆报告正确性的信心判断的现实性？科里亚和戈德史密斯（《心理学评论》103:490 - 517，1996）模型的一个假设是，信心判断调节记忆报告的陈述。我们测试了这个假设是否适用于信心判断现实性（准确性）的调节。在两个实验中，270名处于不同条件的成年人回答了50个关于刚看过视频内容的识别和回忆问题。每次回答后，他们对答案的正确性做出信心判断。在实验1中，识别条件下的参与者在排除15个问题时，其绝对偏差显著增加。在实验2中，回忆条件下的参与者显著提高了校准。结果表明，与识别相比，回忆为参与者提供了更有效的线索来提高其报告的现实性。然而，这些影响很小，对于人们有一定能力调节其信心判断的现实性这一结论，仅有微弱的支持。
