Hayes L J
Behav Anal. 1992 Fall;15(2):139-45. doi: 10.1007/BF03392596.
The present paper compares behavior-analytic and cognitive treatments of the concept of psychological history with regard to its role in current action. Both treatments take the position that the past bears some responsibility for the present, and are thereby obligated to find a means of actualizing the past in the present. Both do so by arguing that the past is brought to bear in the present via the organism. Although the arguments of the two positions differ on this issue, neither provides a complete account. An unconventional treatment of psychological history is proposed, the logic of which is exemplified in anthropological, biological, and psychological perspectives. The unconventional treatment in psychological perspective holds that (a) the organism's interaction with its environment, not the organism itself, changes with experience; and (b) the past interactions of an organism exist as, and only as, the present interactions of that organism. This solution to the problem of psychological history provides obligations and opportunities for analysis that are not available when the more conventional positions of cognitivism and behavior analysis are adopted.
本文比较了行为分析和认知疗法对心理历史概念的处理方式，以及其在当前行为中的作用。两种疗法都认为过去对现在负有一定责任，因此有义务找到一种在当下实现过去的方法。两者都是通过论证过去通过有机体在当下产生影响来做到这一点的。尽管在这个问题上两种立场的论据不同，但都没有提供完整的解释。本文提出了一种对心理历史的非常规处理方式，其逻辑在人类学、生物学和心理学视角中得到了体现。心理学视角下的非常规处理方式认为：（a）有机体与其环境的互动，而非有机体本身，会随着经验而改变；（b）有机体过去的互动仅以该有机体当前的互动形式存在。这种对心理历史问题的解决方案为分析提供了义务和机会，而采用认知主义和行为分析等更传统的立场时则无法获得这些。
