Computer Science, University of York, York YO10 5GH, United Kingdom.
Phys Rev Lett. 2012 Mar 30;108(13):130502. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.130502.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers the promise of absolutely secure communications. However, proofs of absolute security often assume perfect implementation from theory to experiment. Thus, existing systems may be prone to insidious side-channel attacks that rely on flaws in experimental implementation. Here we replace all real channels with virtual channels in a QKD protocol, making the relevant detectors and settings inside private spaces inaccessible while simultaneously acting as a Hilbert space filter to eliminate side-channel attacks. By using a quantum memory we find that we are able to bound the secret-key rate below by the entanglement-distillation rate computed over the distributed states.
量子密钥分发（QKD）提供了绝对安全通信的承诺。然而，从理论到实验的绝对安全证明往往假设完美的实现。因此，现有的系统可能容易受到依赖于实验实现缺陷的阴险的侧信道攻击。在这里，我们用一个 QKD 协议中的虚拟通道取代所有的真实通道，使得相关探测器和内部的私人空间设置无法访问，同时作为一个 Hilbert 空间滤波器来消除侧信道攻击。通过使用量子存储器，我们发现我们能够将秘密密钥率限制在分布状态上的纠缠蒸馏率以下。
